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AVOIDING THE SHAMEFUL BACKLASH:
SOCIAL REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE




For many years, the criminal justice system relied upon jail time to
punish serious offenses and fines to penalize less substantial misdeeds.
Middle ground was hard to come by. But with prisons overcrowded, state
budgets overdrawn, and society reluctant to let crimes go unpunished, a
smattering of innovative judges across the country have been turning to
what are termed "alternative sanctions." Instead of incarceration or fines,
judges are getting creative. They increasingly order sanctions that are all
about publicity, forcing convicts to make a "mea culpa message to the
community."' So, drunk drivers are forced to advertise their misdeeds with
2bumper stickers on their cars, petty thieves are required to broadcast their
transgressions by parading as human billboards,3 and men caught soliciting
J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; B.S.E., M.S.E., University of Michigan. Thanks to
Kenworthey Bilz, Robert Ellickson, Wendy Netter Epstein, Dan Kahan, and Jeffrey
Rachlinski for their thoughtful suggestions and responses to previous drafts.
I Jan Hoffmnan, Crime and Punishment: Shame Gains Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
1997, at Al.
2 See, e.g., Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 124, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per
curiam) (affirming a probation requirement that obliged the defendant to affix a bumper
sticker to his car stating "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE"); Robert Tharp,
Driver's Probation Stiffened After Jury Decision in Road Rage Death: Judge Adds Car
Limits, Jail Time, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 18, 2004, at 1B (noting that a Texas man
was forced to put a special bumper sticker on a low horsepower car after his role in a fatal
crash caused by road rage).
3 See, e.g., Ann Woolner, Op-Ed, Shame as Punishment: Common in Early America, It's
Making a Comeback, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 6, 1997, at 1.
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prostitutes are outed on public television-sometimes even before they are
convicted of their crimes .
4
Shaming penalties, broadly defined, are those sanctions that shine a
spotlight on offenders in order to warn others of antisocial activity and of
the miscreants perpetrating the deeds. Of course, every criminal sanction
seeks to impose some degree of "shame" on the offender, but shaming
sanctions go a step beyond the relative anonymity of isolated imprisonment
or passive fine-paying by broadcasting to all who will listen and by seeking
to provoke communal outrage.
Proponents of shaming argue that it appropriately expresses society's
disgust for criminal activity. Moreover, the stigmatizing effects of
publicizing crime are costly for the people being shamed, and these costs
have the potential to deter shamed convicts from repeating their criminal
acts. Best yet, implementing shaming sanctions is far less costly than
incarcerating offenders,5 so alternative sanctions allow us to enforce the
crimes on the books more completely. Although the amount of specific
deterrence generated by shaming penalties is generally acknowledged to be
an empirical question for which little data is available,6 the topic has
garnered significant scholarly attention discussing how best to reduce the
rate of recidivism.7 In the judicial system, with state criminal sanctions
generally left to judicial discretion, most examples of shaming have been
isolated to individual judges or probation officers with a penchant for
shame.8  But in a logical next step, Dan Kahan and Eric Posner have
recommended amending the federal sentencing guidelines to expressly
4 This phenomenon is called "John TV." See Art Hubacher, Comment, Every Picture
Tells a Story: Is Kansas City's "John TV" Constitutional?, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 551, 552
(1998). Shaming has also provided the storyline for a network television drama in which an
unresponsive landlord was forced to pace in front of his property for eight hours wearing a
sandwich board stating that he was a "slumlord." Boston Legal: Questionable Characters
(ABC television broadcast Nov. 21, 2004). For a more thorough listing of recent shaming
penalties, see Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Penalties Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 733,
734-37 & nn.9-20 (1998).
5 See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 4, at 738; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 385 (1997).
6 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
591,638 (1996).
7 See, e.g., ELIZA AHMED ET AL., SHAME MANAGEMENT THROUGH REINTEGRATION (2001)
(advocating reintegrative, as opposed to stigmatic, shaming); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME,
SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989) (identifying the social conditions necessary for effective
shaming).
8 See, e.g., Ted Poe, Public Humiliation is Effective Deterrent, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 11, 1997, at 31A.
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allow for-and thereby encourage-the widespread stigmatic shaming of
white-collar criminals.
9
These scholars are not alone in their calls to bring back certain
penalties more readily associated with colonial times than the twenty-first
century. After American citizen Michael Fay was caned for a vandalism
conviction in Singapore, movements in Tennessee, Mississippi, and
Arkansas called for reintroducing caning, paddling, and even public
hangings into the penal system.' ° Mississippi state representative Steve
Holland proclaimed himself "fully convinced this will prove a deterrent to
crime.""
Because shaming is so cost-effective, it also creates the possibility that
some crimes of public morality, currently unenforced, will return to favor.'
2
Adultery is still officially illegal in twenty-four states, and while
prosecutions are infrequent, Virginia prosecuted an adultery case in 2004.13
After the defendant entered a guilty plea, the prosecutor proclaimed "it
should now be widely known that adultery is a crime in Virginia.
14
With shaming penalties increasing in recent years and the possible
normalization of shaming looming on the horizon, it is a bit surprising that
virtually all of the academic activity in shaming has focused on the
criminals. To be sure, specific deterrence is necessary for a punishment to
9 Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999); see also Dan M.
Kahan, Shaming White Collar Offenders, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 51 (1999). Kahan and
Posner's proposal, however, has not been met with uniform praise. For the contrary view,
see, for example, John B. Owens, Have We No Shame?: Thoughts on Shaming, "White
Collar" Criminals, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1047 (2000).
10 John Beifuss, Criminal- Weary States Wave the Whip, Noose; 'Old Ideas,' Critics Say,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Feb. 13, 1995, at Al. But see Steven S. Kan, Corporal
Punishments and Optimal Incapacitation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 130 (1996) (arguing that
caning is cruel).
11 Beifuss, supra note 10.
12 To be sure, criminal fines are also cost-effective. But moralistic prosecutors are
unlikely to send the message, for example, that justice is served when an adulterer pays
money for sexual transgressions. Alternative sanctions are appealing, then, because they are
simultaneously cost-effective while signaling the correct expressive content.
13 For more information, see Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Va., ACLU of
Virginia Asking Judge to Rule that State Law Criminalizing Adultery Is Unconstitutional
(Feb. 25, 2004), available at www.acluva.org/newsreleases2004/ Feb25.html.
14 Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2004, at B1.
Additionally, in 2001, Georgia--one of ten states then with an anti-fornication statute-
prosecuted an anti-fornication case, but the conviction was ultimately overturned by the
Georgia Supreme Court on state constitutional grounds. See In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 442,




be effective, but it is not the only consideration. Punishment is a social
function; the act of punishing reflects our social norms but also carries the
capacity to reshape those norms and to alter our social dynamics.'
5
This Article seeks to shift the debate on shaming to question its effect
on social norms. We regularly choose to abide by the laws of the state
because we are driven, interchangeably, by personal self-interest, social
reciprocity,. and inner morality. Shame interacts with each of these core
instincts; thus, we must learn -where alternative sanctions reinforce our
aversions to crime and where they perversely detract from legal
compliance. There are no easy answers here, but our goal is to set out the
contours of the three elemental aversions to crime so that empiricists can
test these hypotheses and so that policy-makers and sentencing officials can
better craft penal sanctions to avoid those that would prove
counterproductive. The discussion that follows addresses what is
essentially a policy concern for when shaming could be effective; in
approaching shaming from this policy perspective, I side-step the
constitutional concerns many scholars and judges have raised as to whether
shaming constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment[]" in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, 16 because this debate is mooted where shaming is
ineffectual.
Before we choose to formalize shaming sanctions, we must be wary of
the effects of increased shame. Intuitively, a saturation of shaming
penalties would lead to less media coverage and would render the sanctions
themselves less effective as specific deterrents. But this Article goes
further. The reasons people do not commit crimes are complex, but these
human heuristics interact meaningfully with our views of social morality,
reciprocity, and retribution, and each of these factors is uniquely influenced
by public displays of shame. This Article will argue that, for certain
crimes, society would be best-served by not flaunting the extent of legal
non-compliance so as to maintain the impression that only deviants would
engage in such behavior. And while such end-motivated social engineering
is typically best avoided, this analysis is crucial in the context of a social
15 See WEN Y. TSAO, RATIONAL APPROACH TO CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 15 (1955) ("[T]he
problem of punishment concerns two parties: 1) society which inflicts punishment; 2) the
law-violator on whom punishment is inflicted.").
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. For competing views on the constitutionality of
shaming, compare United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 596-611 (9th Cir. 2004)
(affirming shaming penalty), with id. at 611-12 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (arguing that
shaming penalties "simply have no place in the majesty of an Article III courtroom"). But
see Garvey, supra note 4, at 776 ("[T]he Supreme Court has all but given up trying to decide
when a punishment becomes disproportionate and therefore offensive to the Eighth
Amendment, leaving the matter largely to legislative judgment.").
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program, like shaming, whose motivation stems from utilitarian
foundations.
Because shaming punishments are not systematically applied and
because general deterrence is notoriously difficult to detect, the effects of
the growth of shaming will not be measurable directly until shaming
actually takes off. But that may be too late to save some social norms that
are particularly sensitive to the perceived rate of social compliance.
Part I of this Article provides a psychological account of the primary
reasons people abstain from committing crimes, using the strength of our
social norms to distinguish the powers of rational economics, social
reciprocity, and inner morality. Parts II, III, and IV then address, in turn,
how these psychological constituents are both bolstered and hindered by
criminal sanctions and what this implies for shaming. Ultimately, we see a
web of effects that, while difficult to parse, suggests that shaming penalties
should be focused and specific in order to avoid sending signals that
perversely detract from broad compliance with the law.
I. WHY PEOPLE COMPLY WITH THE LAW
Many scholars have spent their careers trying to understand what
makes criminals tick. The idea that there is a "criminal mind" that differs
from the innocent mind has been propped up and debunked time and
again. 17 The intrigue in criminal psychology is understandable. With the
development of the positive school of criminal law in the late nineteenth
century, crime began to be seen as "a natural and social phenomenon[] that.
• . cannot be understood unless its causes, whether inherent in the
delinquent or in his environment, are traced."' 8 So social scientists set out
to trace the causes of crime. In the process, crime has been described as a
response to those who feel left out of society,' 9 as one of fifty-two thinking
errors, or as a system of eight overlapping thinking patterns. 20 This is not
the forum to adjudicate that dispute, nor is it necessary in our analysis of
shaming. For our purposes, it is important to note only the non-
controversial point that criminal activity and social values are tightly knit.
2'
Although most research focuses on why a minority of people do
commit crimes, our concern is why the majority do not. It is not enough to
17 For an account of why views of the criminal mind that blame disease or society are
wrong, see STANTON E. SAMENOW, INSIDE THE CRIMINAL MIND 9-23 (1984).
18 TSAO, supra note 15, at 17.
19 SAMENOW, supra note 17, at 11-12.
20 See Glenn D. Walters, The Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles, 22
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 307,309 (1995).
21 See generally Kahan, supra note 5.
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say that the absence of a thinking error leads to criminal law compliance,
because leaming and abiding by criminal laws often requires affirmative
effort and exacts certain costs on each member of society.22 And yet, the
vast majority of us are motivated to learn and obey the rules of the state
because we fear the consequences, because we share in the communal
benefits of compliance, or because some crimes are just too heinous to
imagine ourselves committing.
To understand why we do not commit crimes, we must briefly develop
a sense of the social norms that bind us. We can define a "norm," as do
Ernst Fehr and Simon Gdichter, as "(i) a behavioral regularity that is (ii)
based on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave which triggers
(iii) the enforcement of the prescribed behavior by informal social
sanctions. 23 These norms, in turn, can be characterized as three types:
rational, reciprocal, and moral.
The simplest norms are "rational" in the tradition of law and
economics. Generally speaking, we avoid doing anything that generates an
expected net disutility. We regularly engage in cost-benefit analyses to
determine how many miles-per-hour exceeding the posted speed limit we
are willing to drive or whether waiting for a proper "walk" signal is an
effective use of our time. We are choosing to obey-or ignore-the law as
self-interested cost-minimizers, so if the legal penalties for a given misdeed
plus the reputational costs of being branded a miscreant, discounted by the
probability of apprehension, exceed the benefits of an act or omission, the
"rational" person will choose to conform with legal standards.
A second category includes norms that are conditional and reciprocal
in nature. Peer pressure is often blamed for youthful indiscretions but it
simultaneously encourages the majority of us to abide by customs and to
pay our dues to society, which may explain why people abide by jury
service laws even though the threat of punishment is virtually nil. Those
who serve do so out of a sense of civic obligation, sensing that many people
undergo the same hardships. In order to function, all societies must develop
mechanisms of cooperation, and our reciprocal norms reflect this need for
large-scale group coordination. But cooperation in these circumstances is
conditional on the perception that others are cooperating, as humans loathe
to sit idly while others take advantage.24 Moreover, without some
mechanism for coordination, reciprocal arrangements can easily falter,
creating substantial possibilities for social instability, as exemplified by
22 For example, your taxes do not pay themselves.
23 Ernst Fehr & Simon Gdchter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications
of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EuR. EcoN. REv. 845, 854 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
24 See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Garrett Hardin's classic, The Tragedy of the Commons.2 5  Nonetheless,
there is evidence to suggest that humans instinctively cooperate even when
it may not be in their self-interest to do so.
26
Our strongest social values are reflected in norms of morality. Some
of these are assigned the normatively-loaded moniker "natural law," but the
origins of natural law are unclear. Indeed, the endogeny of natural law
norms is telling. Some social norms are so strong that they cease to be
strictly social values and are instead absorbed into each individual's
identity, but where these norms come from and how they strengthen to the
point of self-identity is generally uncertain.27 Still, if you ask a person on
the street what keeps him from murdering his neighbor, he would probably
respond that murder is wrong-period. That the penalties are steep or lax is
generally irrelevant when we ascribe our actions to morality, but the
seriousness of the punishment for a crime may affect its moral weight in the
first place. According to the phenomenon of moral values, our membership
in groups contributes to our self-definition and self-esteem and leads us to
adopt universally-held social beliefs as our own. 28 These norms are passed
from generation to generation through religious indoctrination, social
uniformity, and raw human nature.
We can think of these three species of norms in their most-extreme
forms as three species of human beings. The "rational" man of law and
economics fame is commonly known as Homo economicus, and the
"reciprocal" man has been named Homo reciprocans. For the criminal
aversion that stems from our inner morality, we'll have to choose a name of
our own, and for the sake of consistency, we will use Homo moralis.
Of course, this trichotomy is a simplification of complex sociological
relationships that are still not fully understood. This setup is intended only
to provide a plausible framework for the principal reasons we stay within
25 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCl. 1243 (1968).
26 See Fehr & Gichter, supra note 23, at 845 ("There can be little doubt that selfish
people exist and that material payoffs are powerful motivators. However, a large number of
studies shows that many people are also driven by reciprocity.").
27 Martin L. Hoffman, Moral Internalization: Current Theory and Research, in 10
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 85 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977) ("The
legacy of both Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheirn is the agreement among social scientists
that most people do not go through life viewing society's moral norms as external,
coercively imposed pressures to which they must submit. Though the norms are initially
external to the individual and often in conflict with his desires, the norms eventually become
part of his internal motive system and guide his behavior even in the absence of external
authority.").
28 See James E. Cameron, Social Identity and the Pursuit of Possible Selves: Implications
for the Psychological Well-Being of University Students, 3 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RES.,
& PRAC. 179,179 (1999).
20051
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the laws. These are the elemental forces-there is a little bit of economicus,
reciprocans, and moralis in each one of us, and their relative influences
wax and wane according to the circumstances and the particular social
norms at stake. By analyzing the effects of punishment on these
fundamental instincts, it becomes clear that not all crimes are equally suited
to shaming sanctions.
The Parts that follow will address the social norms of economics,
reciprocity, and morality, discussing both where these norms are
particularly prevalent and how they interact with ordinary punishments and
alternative sanctions.
II. HOMO ECONOMICUS
The most well-known of our three species is the rational Homo
economicus. At its most extreme, as set out by Mancur Olson,29 scholars
have argued that self-interest and nothing else guides our decision-
making.30 Although Olson's conclusions have been criticized,31 there is still
ample evidence to suggest that Homo economicus persists. 32 At least in
concert with the other elemental aversions, we naturally avoid activities that
cause us net harm. And if a proscription has not risen to the level of
morality and no cooperative norm governs our adherence, then self-interest
will be the primary force governing our decision-making. So the decisions
whether to cross a street at the proper crosswalk, whether to use a friend's
prescription medication, and whether to travel sixty-two in a fifty-five are
guided mostly by our cost-benefit instincts. This is not to say that some
people do not consider jaywalking immoral, but it is a fair generalization to
assert that for most minor malum prohibitum offenses, it is the fear of
punishment that most strongly regulates our behavior.
Where strong social norms are absent, government is typically hard-
pressed to regulate. 33 Human decision-making is governed by a "freedom
29 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d prtg. 1971).
30 Id. at 2.
31 See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 71 (2003) ("[A]s a wealth of social science evidence makes clear, Olson's
Logic is false."); see also infra Part III (discussing how our interests in reciprocity often
trump bare rationality). But see OLSON, supra note 29, at vii (prefacing his second printing
by maintaining that "[t]here [had] been no change in [his] views to justify rewriting the
present text").
32 See Fehr & Gichter, supra note 23, at 847 (noting that in six studies of reciprocity, "a
non-trivial minority of subjects exhibits selfish behavior").
33 The government is typically hard-pressed to solve society's woes through punitive
legislation. A prime example is prohibition. Without public support, the temperance
movement was bound to failure. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS,
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of action" in which we select our best course from among a spectrum of
options.34 Regulation of our Homo economicus instincts is intended to
make socially undesirable options more costly and thereby less likely to be
chosen. In these circumstances, the costs of punishment matter and the
perceived risks of being caught have the potential to alter behavioral
patterns. Traffic law compliance, for example, is sensitive to perceived
enforcement rates 35 and penalties, 36 as each person weighs these costs
against the urgency of traveling more rapidly than the posted speed.
The Homo economicus aversion relies on snap judgments, perceived
costs, and heuristic-biased risk assessments. So while our rational instincts
are well-known, the conclusions we may draw are limited-mathematical
calculations are frustratingly difficult to generalize. This Part is divided
into two Sections. Section A addresses the three core components of the
Homo economicus risk calculus and discusses how each can be reinforced
or cut down by punishment. Section B discusses the problems of catering
to our Homo economicus needs.
A. THE FRAMEWORK FOR HOMO ECONOMICUS
In general, where our Homo economicus instincts predominate, we
take whatever actions will maximize our expected utility. Simply put, we
choose to disobey the law when our net utility for an act or omission
exceeds the disutility of being caught discounted by the probability
thereof.37 From a law enforcement perspective, the goal has long been to
create optimal deterrence by "associating with the idea of [a crime] a
deterrent sense of terror."3 8  But to fully evaluate the efficacy of
punishments-in our case, increased use of shaming punishments-we
must evaluate the effects of punishment on each of the inputs to an
individual's decision: the utility of committing a crime, the probability of
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 5 (1973) ("Social problems cannot be
solved by a statute.") (quotations omitted).
34 See JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 1 (1966).
35 Many municipalities have been installing red-light cameras that take pictures of every
automobile improperly proceeding through an intersection. Initial studies suggest that these
cameras dramatically increase red-light compliance. See Jonathan Miller, With Cameras on
the Corner, Your Ticket Is in the Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at G2.
36 See, e.g., US 84/285 Reconstruction Project, Increased Law Enforcement & Double
Fines Combat Speeders Through Construction Zones on 84/285 Between Santa Fe &
Pojoaque (Jan. 10, 2003), http://us84-285.com/news 1 10 03.htm (announcing double fines
in construction areas and increased enforcement in order to promote increased compliance
with posted traffic laws).
37 By using a net utility, this formulation accounts for the lost utility or disutility that
flows from not pursuing the other course of action.
38 COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 26 (Am. ed. 1907).
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being caught, and the disutility of punishment. Subsections 1, 2, and 3 will
address these components in turn.
1. Utility of Committing Crime
Some criminals get a thrill from their illicit activity. They like feeling
power over their victims. Or, they benefit financially from escaping the
constraints of regulatory law or selling wares on the black market. Crimes
are committed for a reason, and these reasons differ across crimes and
criminals. Our concern is how this criminal utility-isolated from the rate
of criminal enforcement and the criminal penalties themselves-is affected
by the risk of punishment.
Intuitively, the effect should be minimal. Whether there is a penalty or
not, the same positive act would logically accord the same positive benefits.
But the theory of psychological reactance suggests otherwise.
Psychological reactance, first theorized by Jack Brehm, suggests that a
person becomes motivationally aroused when he perceives his freedom to
be threatened.39 So the ignominy and risk associated with criminal activity
may initially make a given criminal act more appealing to potential
criminals. Brehm suggests that reactance persists until a person restores the
freedom he lost,40 meaning that sometimes, increasing penalties could
perversely increase the incidence of crime.4'
Experimental data support Brehm's hypothesis that compliance with
threats is inversely related to threats against one's freedom, at least where
relatively minor violations are concerned. In a controlled study of
bathroom graffiti at the University of Texas, James Pennebaker and
Deborah Sanders posted signs inside bathroom stalls. They varied the
threatened punishments and the level of authority supposedly issuing the
threats. Counting each graffito, they observed a strong positive correlation
between the magnitude of the threat, the authority of the threat-maker, and
the amount of graffiti vandalism in the bathroom stall.42 As Pennebaker
and Sanders concluded: "When the threat to a freedom is sufficiently high,
the person tends to respond by not complying with the threat. When the
threat to freedom is low, little or no reactance is aroused and the person
39 See BRE-M, supra note 34, at 6.
40 See id. at 2.
41 At this point, we have yet to consider the counterbalancing effects of the perceived
probability of capture and the disutility of the punishment itself. But it is conceivable that,
where a crime is virtually unenforceable, criminalizing the offense will only make it more
prevalent.
42 James W. Pennebaker & Deborah Yates Sanders, American Graffiti: Effects of
Authority and Reactance Arousal, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 264,266 (1976).
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may not feel compelled to attempt to restore the threatened freedom., 43 So,
counterintuitively, the introduction of sanctions can make crime more
attractive."
Similarly, the remarkable Israeli day-care study of Uri Gneezy and
Aldo Rustichini45 supports the assertion that, for minor Homo economicus-
type crimes, reactance may outweigh deterrence. Gneezy and Rustichini
studied day-care centers where parents would regularly leave their children
after the posted closing time. Leaving other factors unchanged, some of the
day-care facilities began to impose a small monetary fine-about $3-for
late-coming parents.46 But despite the deterrence hypothesis, under which
moving from no cost to positive cost should increase compliance, the rate of
noncompliance for day-care centers with fines was nearly double that of the
control group.4 7 Although there may have been some other psychological
interactions at play here, the study demonstrates that penalties do not
always have the intuitive response.
Shaming penalties may trigger reactance at a higher rate than
traditional criminal sanctions. Although imprisonment certainly restricts
freedom, it is not accompanied by the surefire publicity of public
humiliation.48 Thus, if-as Kahan and Posner advocate-shaming were
ever a standard punishment for particular crimes, this could trigger the
perverse psychological incentive to skirt these laws and risk highly public
embarrassment. Further empirical research on the relationship between
notoriety and reactance would be warranted.
2. Probability of Being Caught
Public perception of the enforcement rate is an important element in
changing people's minds about the costs of crime. In the late 1990s, New
Orleans officials tried to crack down on indecent exposure during the
festivities accompanying Mardi Gras. However, they failed and ultimately
gave up because they were unable to arrest enough people to create the
" Id. at 264.
44 On the flip side, criminalization of certain acts can trigger first-party moral norms that
make the act less desirable. This phenomenon, although arguably relevant in the Homo
economicus calculus, will be discussed infra in Part IV.
45 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
46 Id. at 4-5.
47 Id. at 7. This result was confirmed by a second study in 2005. See Uri Gneezy &
Aldo Rustichini, The Second Day-Care Study (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/uri.gneezy/vita/The%20Second%20Stduy.pdf.
48 Recall that Pennebaker and Sanders saw their reactance increase with the severity of
the punishment. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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perception that disrobing was a risky activity. 49 But how effective would
they have been if instead of secretly transporting offenders to the city jail,
they had staged public shaming rituals the next day?
Of course, if shaming penalties (because of their low-cost nature)
allowed more enforcement of criminal laws, the probability of being caught
would increase,5 ° thereby counteracting some or all of the effects of
psychological reactance. Moreover, since this Homo economicus
calculation is made by humans with our notorious inadequacies in
calculating true likelihoods and accurate costs ex ante, the salience of
shaming penalties becomes important. 51 The work of Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman suggests that human risk-assessment suffers from an
availability heuristic, in which we systematically overestimate the
frequency of events that come to mind easily.52 Regular exposure to
shaming penalties would leave us to conclude that shame was
commonplace and that enforcement rates were high-or at least higher than
reality. We make our judgments based on how often we perceive offenders
to be convicted and punished, so artificially elevating this perception could
be effective.
However, just as increasing the frequency of public punishment makes
it seem more available-leading potential criminals to fear the
consequences-frequent punishment signals that the stigma attached to
each individual criminal is lower. It is one thing, after all, if sandwich-
49 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit
Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 368 (2003).
50 See Kahan, supra note 5, at 385 ("[S]haming penalties cost much less than
incarceration."); Editorial, Alternative Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1997, at A16;
George F. Will, It's Cheaper than Prison: Shame the Bad Guys, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 25,
1996, at F2. But there may be some crimes-like adultery, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text-that we want to keep on the books to represent our disapproval, but
don't want to enforce for whatever reason. So whether law enforcement officials would
choose to use extra resources to enforce additional crimes is a political determination.
51 See Pamela Latimore & Ann Witte, Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty:
The Criminal Choice, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON
OFFENDING 129, 131 (Derek Cornish & Ronald Clarke eds., 1986) ("[S]tudies have found
that probabilities used in decision making tend to be subjective rather than objective."); cf
HUGH LAURENCE Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER (rev. ed. 1984) (noting that public
education programs are initially successful in reducing drunk driving because the approach is
visible, but suggesting that the effectiveness wanes once the programs become more
ordinary).
52 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning:
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOLGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
[Vol. 96
A VOIDING THE SHAMEFUL BACKLASH
board parades happen once every year; but if there is a convict with a
sandwich board on every street corner, then the potential criminal would
conclude that the stigma was less burdensome.5 3 Thus, frequency runs anti-
parallel to stigma, which we consider next.
3. Disutility of Being Caught
"Deterrence is a function of the declaration of some harm, loss,
deprivation, or pain that will follow noncompliance with commands. ' 54 We
can describe the total cost of conviction as the sum of the costs of
punishment and reintegration. Punishment includes the tangible costs of
legal defense, lost wages, and monetary sanctions imposed by the court.
Reintegration includes the less tangible costs of rebuilding one's reputation
and absorbing the stigma that attaches to criminal conviction. When trying
to establish a proper level of deterrence, judges can control the costs of
punishment to a given convict, 55 but the reintegration costs are more
difficult to compute and would be affected by increased use of shaming
sanctions.
One of the principal attractions of shaming sanctions is that they can
increase the costs of reintegration-which by and large require no state
action-while decreasing the punishment costs which typically involve
costs borne by the state as well. And shame's defenders typically argue that
the stigma of public humiliation is a powerful cost 56-especially because
we tend to overestimate the extent of our own personal shame. 57 But, as
53 See Kahan, supra note 5, at 394.
54 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 33, at 91.
55 Addressing the change in punishment costs associated with an increased use in
shaming is fairly straightforward. If a crime, previously unenforced, was enforced by
shaming sanctions, punishment costs would rise. If a crime otherwise punished with
confinement changed to public shaming, punishment costs would decline, but reintegration
costs would rise, as sentencing officials would apparently attempt to maintain a constant
level of total punishment.
56 See Dale Lezon, Probation Term Sends Message; Judge Encourages Others to Use
Signs To 'Change Behavior,' Hous. CHRON., June 3, 2002, at A21 ("[C]riminal justice
scholars and judges said public humiliation can often be one of the most effective
punishments and deterrents to crime."); Poe, supra note 8 ("Our founders knew that the
judgment of a friend, a neighbor or family members held far greater significance than that of
the jailer or judge.").
57 See Thomas Gilovich et al., The Spotlight Effect in Social Judgment: An Egocentric
Bias in Estimates of Salience of One's Own Actions and Appearance, 78 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 211 (2000). Gilovich et al. demonstrated-by cleverly forcing undergraduate
students to wear embarrassing Barry Manilow t-shirts-that individuals overestimate their
own shame, attributing this phenomenon to "the T-shirt wearers' feelings of being 'in the
spotlight."' Id. at 213. But while the spotlight effect may bolster the baseline deterrence of
shaming, there is no evidence that this effect would persist if everybody were forced to
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shaming becomes more commonplace, it is no longer quite as shocking and
the stigmatic effect is enervated.58
This effect can be seen by reference to the economic costs of stigma.
Among job applicants with equivalent credentials, a criminal history is
often a disqualifying blunder, leaving ex-convicts to suffer through
underemployment long after they have served their time. But this
phenomenon rests on the ability of employers to find unblemished
applicants; to the extent that more job-hunters have criminal histories, the
stigmatic effect of their records will be lessened.5 9
Socially, prizes are coveted because of their rarity and punishments are
feared unless commonplace. Grade inflation made earning top marks at
Princeton so pedestrian that the Ivy League school was forced to form a
faculty committee to adopt new policies. 60  Conversely, middle-school
detention is far more palatable when the detainee is joined by a crowd. And
among African-American males, imprisonment has such high frequency
that its deterrent effect has been substantially lost.61  Toni Massaro
recognized this phenomenon as applied to alternative sanctions, noting that
although it would still be cost-effective to publicize the shame of millions
of people each year, "[t]hese penalties would soon be ignored. ''62  As
shaming becomes more popular, we must not forget that the reason public
humiliation can be a deterrent is because of its circus appeal. Shaming is a
curiosity for which over-expansion could be self-defeating.
B. OPTIMIZING SHAME FOR HOMO ECONOMICUS
The instincts of Homo economicus potentially limit the effectiveness
of shame. For certain crimes-which, I dare not predict-the deterrent
advertise a fondness for Copacabana. In fact, the Gilovich et al. study showed that the
spotlight effect was even more dramatic when the study participants were able to choose a
non-shameful t-shirt of their choosing. See id. at 215. So this salience concern may not be
unique to our discussions of alternative sanctions.
58 See Kahan, supra note 5, at 357 (discussing stigma enervation); Toni M. Massaro, The
Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 645, 650
(1997) (arguing that our failure to be shocked by anything leads increasingly to certain
behaviors becoming destigmatized).
59 This process is analyzed in Eric Rasmussen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of
Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996). See also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS
110 (2000) (noting this effect).
60 See Karen W. Arenson, Princeton: A Curb on Grade Inflation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2004, at B6; Karen W. Arenson, Princeton Tries to Put a Cap on Giving A 's, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2004, at BI.
61 See Kahan, supra note 5, at 357.
62 Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1931 (1991).
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effect of stigmatic shaming may be insufficient to overcome psychological
reactance. And even this relationship is a function of the overall frequency
of shaming.63
At least for economic stigma and the job-seeking problem, Eric
Rasmussen has sought to develop a mathematical formulation.64 Not
surprisingly, his model incorporates the criteria discussed above-the utility
for criminal acts, penalties, perceived conviction rates, and the overall
perceived rate of criminality-as well as the costs of crime to society.65
This analysis advances the idea that there is some optimal amount of shame
that we can introduce through our system of criminal justice.
Of course, theory is simpler than practice. As Eric Posner has noted,
the factors that weigh on the deterrence provided by shaming are so
complex and interrelated that achieving a proper level of ostracism is no
small feat.66 And while a structured system of shaming is likely to be less
variable than existing informal social mechanisms for shame,67 factors like
an individual's standing in the community, the negative exposure he will
attract, and the outrage his conduct will provoke would need to be further
understood if this optimal level of shaming could be achieved.
A second problem with a hypothetical pursuit of our optimal shame
quotient is that shame is a public good that is currently doled out in an ad
hoc fashion in thousands of courthouses nationwide. The current
sentencing system, then, creates a commons problem, whereby shaming is
potentially useful only in moderation, but for which there is no existing
mechanism to moderate anybody's usage. These concerns do not weigh on
the ultimate theoretical propriety of shaming punishments but still introduce
additional systemic costs of monitoring and coordinating otherwise
autonomous judges.
III. HoMo RECIPROCANS
Why are we honest on our taxes if the audit rate is less than one-half
percent? 68 And why do we show up for jury duty, where we are underpaid
63 This terminology, "overall frequency," is intentionally vague. Certain shaming
penalties are intended to incite different populations, be they local, regional, or national. If
we were conducting a study of shame frequency, it might be appropriate to focus on media
markets, since so much word-of-mouth discussion is controlled by media influences.
64 Rasmussen, supra note 59, at 522-32.
65 Id. at 523-24.
66 POSNER, supra note 59, at 92-94. Posner further argues that the arbitrariness of
shaming punishments led earlier implementations to be abandoned. See id. at 103-06.
67 Id. at 94.
68 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., IRS AUDIT RATES, GAO-01-484 (2001), available at
http://www.unclefed.com/GAOReports/gao0 1-484.pdf. Of course, the IRS auditing
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and underutilized, instead of simply shirking the responsibility? In The
Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson suggested that without external
incentives, rational humans would not take actions outside their limited
self-interest. 69  But there is ample evidence to establish that Homo
reciprocans exists and that, self-interest notwithstanding, "[w]hen they
perceive that others are behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by
honor, altruism, and like dispositions to contribute to public goods even
without the inducement of material incentives." 70 Our reciprocal norms are
quite different from moral instincts in that, whereas morality is internalized,
reciprocity requires social dedication to common goals and is therefore
conditional upon the actions of others. This Part is divided into two
Sections. Section A provides evidence to support the proposition that
Homo reciprocans exists and describes the key characteristics of reciprocal
norms. Section B looks at how shaming practices interact with our
reciprocal instincts and notes that in the case of promoting tax compliance,
shaming penalties that are now being introduced are unwise.
A. HOMO RECIPROCANS EXISTS
Although insisting that humans are a friendly, cooperative species may
sound a bit romantic, there is considerable evidence to suggest that we are
capable of seeing beyond our narrow self-interest to promote social
benefits. As Dan Kahan has argued: "Most persons think of themselves and
want to be understood by others as cooperative and trustworthy and are thus
willing to contribute their fair share to securing collective goods. By the
same token, most individuals loathe being taken advantage of. ' 71 This is
our prototype for Homo reciprocans: an organism that is willing to
contribute his fair share for the common good but only so far as the
contribution is mutual.
The classic psychological experiment demonstrating the power of
reciprocity was developed by Werner Glith, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd
Schwarze in the early 1980s. 72  Their well-known experiment was an
ultimatum bargaining game. In the "easy" version of their game, two
players are given the chance to share a pot of money of value c. The first
mechanism is not completely random. Those who cheat are presumably more likely to be
visited by the IRS.
69 OLSON, supra note 29, at 2; see supra Part II (discussing Homo economicus).
70 Kahan, supra note 31, at 71. There is also ample evidence to suggest that Homo
economicus exists. See supra Part I1.
71 Kahan, supra note 31, at 73.
72 Werner Gith et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982).
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player (the offeror) gets one opportunity to divvy up the pot between
himself and the offeree. The offeree, then, can either accept the offer and
pocket his take or he can reject the offer, in which case both parties go
home empty-handed.73 If reciprocity and fairness were not considerations,
the profit-maximizing "rational" offeree would accept even the smallest
offer of money e > 0, so the offeror should offer 6 and keep c-6 for
himself.74  But this hypothesis is easily rejected by experimental data;
offerors repeatedly make offers considerably more than a pittance and
offerees reject small proposals even though it means betraying their
monetary self-interest. 75  Study participants were more generous than
"rational" 76 and were capable of punishing others at their own expense.
Similar studies have confirmed this phenomenon, 77 suggesting that fairness
and common interest have some positive value in our decisions on how to
act.
73 See id. at 371.
71 Id. at 372.
75 See id. at 375 tbls.4-5.
76 I use the term "rational" to suggest the rationality of the profit-maximizing Homo
economicus. It is certainly plausible, however, to conceive of a rationality where charity and
cooperation are accorded positive utility.
77 Subjects in Indonesia exhibited the same behavior even when three months' income
was on the line. See Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game:
Experimental Evidence from Indonesia, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 47, 55 (1999). And when the
"take-it-or-leave-it" aspect of the ultimatum game was transformed into a "take-it" dictator
game-in which the second player has no opportunity to reject his take-more than sixty
percent of "dictators" ignored their rational self-interest and twenty-two percent gave their
partners at least half of the pot. Robert Forsythe et al., Fairness in Simple Bargaining
Experiments, 6 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 347, 362 (1994). But the Forsythe study suggested
that fairness cannot account for all of the generosity from the ultimatum game. Although
some of the results were statistically ambiguous, some of the comparisons between the
ultimatum game and the dictator game resulted in different probability distributions. Id. The
authors suggested that the differences between the results in ultimatum and dictator games
could be explained if some people have negative utility for "spite." Id. at 362-63.
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n-Player public goods experiments go one step further.78 In these
multi-stage games, participants make anonymous contributions to a
common pool or choose to dedicate their funds to private interests.
Resources contributed to the public good work a higher rate of return than
resources contributed to private goods, but the profits are divided among
the population such that each player's dominant strategy is to contribute
nothing to the common pool. 79 While Homo economicus would attempt to
free-ride, studies have shown that three-quarters of subjects are
cooperative 80 and that half of these cooperators fully understand that they
are economically better-off to choose otherwise. 81 However, as the game
progresses and it becomes clear that not everybody is reciprocating,
cooperation falls. 82  Once again, we see that humans are willing to
cooperate for a common, social good but are unwilling to be taken
advantage of.
78 The more familiar subset of the n-player game is the two-player Prisoners' Dilemma.
In the two-player game, conditional reciprocity can be characterized as an "optimal" strategy
in a long-term game. Two-party interactions are not particularly relevant for our general
deterrence calculations, but the two-player Prisoners' Dilemma does suggest that sometimes,
cooperation is an optimal behavior.
In the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game, each party has the option to "cooperate" or to
"defect" in each round of the game. Mutual cooperation leads to the best results for
everybody, but defection is the dominant strategy for both players when they unilaterally
assess their options, leading to a predicted equilibrium of mutual defection. However, when
the game is extended to multiple periods, reciprocal behavior has been shown to be profit-
maximizing. In two well-known competitions, Robert Axelrod invited theorists to design
decision-making algorithms. He ran a Prisoners' Dilemma tournament in which each entry
competed round-robin against all the others. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 30-31 (1984). The entry that won his first tournament corresponds closely to
our vision of Homo reciprocans. This algorithm-the simplest entry in the tournament-is
called "TIT FOR TAT." Like Homo reciprocans, TIT FOR TAT starts out by cooperating
and will continue to do so until it is betrayed. Then, it punishes the betrayal by defecting in
the following round. But, TIT FOR TAT is forgiving, and so long as its opponent has
returned to its cooperative ways, it returns to being nice. See id. at 33.
This simple strategy is so powerful that when Axelrod ran a second tournament with
sixty-three entries-all of whom knew that TIT FOR TAT was the defending champion-
TIT FOR TAT won again. Id. app. A at 195-201. So, perhaps the reason that humans are
generally cooperative but refuse to be taken advantage of is because this is a long-term
strategy for success that we have learned from our one-on-one interactions.
79 This is an iterated multi-player Prisoners' Dilemma. For further conclusions about the
Prisoners' Dilemma, see infra text accompanying notes 86-87.
80 See, e.g., James Andreoni, Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or
Confusion?, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 891,900 (1995).
81 id.
82 See id at 896 tbl.2; SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, Is EQUALITY PASS0? HoMo
RECIPROCANS AND THE FUTURE OF EGALITARIAN POLITICS 10-11 (Oct. 19, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/isinequa.pdf.
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Psychological evidence from trust- and gift-exchange games affirms
this proposition,83 leading to the conclusion that "a large fraction of the
people has a willingness to pay for rewarding kind and punishing hostile
acts.",84 This experimental evidence extends to political decision-making as
well. Most Americans are generally supportive of programs like welfare,
but in a nod to reciprocity, they support a mandated work requirement for
those on the government dole.85
Additionally, there is scientific evidence that humans value
reciprocating with other humans. In a neurological study, a group of
professors at Emory University used functional magnetic resonance
16imaging (fMRI) to test brain stimulation during cooperative activities.
They found that when humans played Prisoners' Dilemma games with other
humans and both cooperated, various brain activities were triggered that
were not triggered when the subjects knew they were playing against a
computer. 87 I am loath to draw conclusions from my understanding of
neurology, but perhaps this suggests that humans have an innate sensitivity
for reciprocity that serves as further proof that Homo reciprocans is real.
B. HOW HOMO RECIPROCANS RESPONDS TO THE SHAME OF OTHERS
Homo reciprocans wants to cooperate, but only so long as he feels that
others are playing fairly. Nobody likes to feel taken. This instinct applies
wherever our communal instincts are strong. This isn't always the case-it
would be quite strange to argue that the reason we don't commit murder is
because we have mutually determined that we don't want to live in a
community in which we kill each other.8 The conclusion, of course, is
true, but reciprocity isn't the reason we do not commit murder. Violence is
typically governed by Homo moralis instincts, whereas our interactions
with society-at-large are frequently governed by Homo reciprocans. Where
we contribute to public goods, reciprocity is king, and it is dangerous to
mess with the perception that everybody is cooperating. Pessimistic
expectations about the behavior of others make it difficult to sustain
83 "In a gift exchange game a player A can voluntarily transfer resources to player B. A
transfer from A represents a 'gift' because player B has no obligation to pay for the transfer.
After observing A's choice B can also transfer resources to A. In case of reciprocal transfers
both players are in general better off." Fehr & Gichter, supra note 23, at 846.
84 id.
85 See BOWLES & GNTis, supra note 82, at 9.
86 James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Cooperation, 35 NEURON 395 (2002).
87 See id. at 403.
88 The conclusion, of course, is true, but it is not the reason we do not commit murder.
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reciprocal norms. 89 Nonetheless, creative legislators have taken steps to
shame criminals into fulfilling their civic duties, but this trend reflects a
short-sighted misjudgment that may result in overall lower compliance for
affected laws.
Of course, when our reciprocal norms are violated, the violations must
be punished. But the method of punishment chosen has significant
implications for how the violation will affect the norm itself. Broadly
speaking, the lessons of Homo reciprocans teach us to emphasize the
positive and to reinforce social norms with evidence of broad compliance
rather than to mess with the economic incentives or to throw around idle
threats. Recognizing the value of social norms, our nation's anti-drug
campaign has shifted from emphasizing what your brain will look like if
you use drugs90 to proclaiming how few teenagers actually do experiment
with illegal and damaging substances.91 But, there are plenty of instances
where the dynamics of reciprocity are being ignored, and shaming in
particular has the possibility to damage our sense of social unity.
There are two principal messages that can be sent through criminal
sanctions intended to defend reciprocal norms. These messages suggest
alternately that the offender is a rare social deviant or that the norm itself is
less universal than previously anticipated. The former message supports
and reinforces our Homo reciprocans instincts; the latter is dangerous. We
can see both if we look at the classic example of civic responsibility: paying
taxes.
It is not intuitive, but tax compliance is remarkably insensitive to the
enforcement rate. Accordingly, the IRS was able to scale back its auditing
efforts by seventy percent from 1996 to 200092 without fearing a fourfold
rise in tax cheats. Empirical research suggests that "an individual's
perception of the extent of evasion powerfully predicts compliance
89 See Fehr & Gachter, supra note 23, at 855.
90 The egg-frying "this is your brain on drugs" campaign has been described as one of
the most influential ads in television history. But many students rejected the premise of the
advertisement and instead were encouraged to experiment with drugs as a result. As a
college student reflected on the ad campaign, "I think that a scare tactic acts as more of a
dare than it does actually scare kids away from using drugs." Erika Alexander, Famous
Fried Eggs: Students Debate Effectiveness, Accuracy of Well-Known Drug Commercial,
CNNFYI.COM, Dec. 6, 2000, http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/fyi/interactive/news/brain/
brain.on.drugs.html.
91 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, ONDCP to Unveil Youth
Brand in September; Kids Nationwide to Identify What Stands Between Them and Drugs
(Sept. 8, 2000), available at http://www.mediacampaign.org/whatsyourantidrug/
adrelease.html (introducing an ad campaign emphasizing that the majority of teenagers
have never used illicit drugs).
92 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., supra note 68, at 2.
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behavior: the higher an individual believes the rate of tax cheating to be, the
more likely he or she is to cheat too. '93 And yet, legislatures have begun
working against this known social behavior by introducing shaming
sanctions in tax law that promote the impression that tax evasion is
commonplace.
Several states have begun publishing lists of their worst tax
offenders.94  Their argument is standard-fare specific deterrence: if tax
offenders know that their identities will be publicized, they will fear
additional reputational costs and will be encouraged to comply with the law
and to pay their overdue fees. A Wisconsin state representative who
authored a shaming bill for the State Assembly argued that his proposed
"Website of Shame [would] force delinquent taxpayers out of hiding, and
into the public. 95  As evidence, he pointed to taxes collected from
delinquent accounts once similar programs were implemented in
Connecticut and Illinois.96 But in our Homo reciprocans mindset, this
misses the mark-winning the tax revenues of a subset of violators is a
pyrrhic victory when the techniques result in lower overall tax compliance.
The fisc would be better off if the states promoted the truthful notion that
the vast majority of residents do pay their taxes in full and on time. This is
not to say that we should not enforce the law against those who cheat, but
using the mechanics of shame is liable to result in a perverse feedback
among an audience of Homo reciprocans.
Not wanting to be outdone, the federal government has recently
introduced shaming measures of its own into the tax code. These measures
93 See Kahan, supra note 31, at 81; see also Robert C. Cialdini, Social Motivations to
Comply, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 200, 215 (1989) (citing an IRS commissioned report to
suggest that "admitted noncompliers are more likely to estimate high levels of
noncompliance within the general public" and noting that "there is a clear, positive
relationship between self-reported evasion and the tax evasion of friends and relatives-this
is, similar others); cf Kahan, supra note 5, at 354 & n. 18 (noting that this effect generalizes).
94 See, e.g., State of Conn. Dep't of Rev. Servs., DRS: Top 100 Delinquent Taxpayer
Accounts, http://www.ct.gov/drs/site/default.asp (follow "Top 100 Delinquent Taxpayers
List" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 22, 2005); La. Dep't of Rev., Cybershame,
http://www.rev.state.la.us/sections/ cybershame (last visited Nov. 22, 2005); see also Spies
Online, Delinquent Taxpayers, http://www.spiesonline.net/delinquent-taxpayers.shtml (last
visited Oct. 9, 2005) (collecting links to state websites publicizing tax delinquents).
95 Press Release, Representative Frank Lasee, Assembly to Vote on Website of Shame
(March 3, 2003), http://www.legis.state.wi.us/assembly/asm02/news/pr3304.pdf. Although
Rep. Lasee's measure passed the Wisconsin House on March 10, 2004, it never passed in the
Senate. See Bill Tracking for Wisc. A.B. 473 (2003).
96 See Press Release, supra note 95.
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have been attacked as ineffective and poorly-designed 97 and they are
unlikely to have any large impact on tax compliance, but they still represent
a fundamental misunderstanding as to where publicity and shame can be
effective and where they should be avoided.
The federal government's shaming measures actually don't enforce the
criminal law at all. Instead, the provisions are directed at tax-motivated
expatriation: when Americans renounce their citizenship in order to avoid
paying their taxes.98 As part of HIPAA, Congress required the IRS to
publish quarterly listings of Americans who renounce their citizenship.
99
And a month later, as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996,10 ° Congress adopted the Reed Amendment,
which makes tax-motivated expatriates (as determined by the Attorney
General) ineligible for readmission to the country.' 01
As usual, the rationale for this provision was understandable and
focused at the tax-motivated expatriates themselves. Congressman Charles
Rangel characterized expatriates as "people that America has given so much
to... [who] care so little about that citizenship that they would flee in order
to avoid taxes."'' 0 2  But Congress never set out to examine how Homo
reciprocans would respond to the new information. Under our
psychological framework, we consider the maintenance of our country a
cooperative responsibility. But if we perceive that other people are taking
advantage of American citizenship and defecting when it is in their self-
interest to do so, more future defections are likely.
10 3
97 See Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions for the Federal Tax Law: Symbols,
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L.
REv. 863,909 (2004).
98 See id. at 888-90.
99 I.R.C. § 6039G(e) (2000). For a sample listing of expatriates, see Quarterly
Publication of Individuals, Who Have Chosen to Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G,
67 Fed. Reg. 19,621 (Apr. 22, 2002).
100 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2000)).
101 Id. For a discussion of this provision's history, see Kirsch, supra note 97, at 891
n.133.
102 141 CONG. REC. H3996 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1995).
103 Ironically, bringing attention to tax-motivated expatriates might also introduce the
possibility to unwitting citizens who could take advantage of a tax break. Still, because
I.R.C. § 6039G requires the listing of all expatriates (not only tax-motivated) and because
the re-entry bar is unlikely to generate much publicity, the shaming sanction Congress
sought to impose does not specifically stigmatize people who leave the country for tax
reasons. Kirsch, supra note 97, at 909; see Kahan, supra note 6, at 594 (suggesting that
effective penalties must "unambiguously express condemnation"). Furthermore, there is no
evidence that anybody actually reads obscure publications in the Federal Register, which
would be required for any stigma to attach. See Massaro, supra note 62, at 1883.
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So how, then, could shaming tax-cheats actually reinforce our
reciprocal norms? The answer lies in targeting our shaming instead of
casting a broad net against all tax delinquents. If tax evaders are portrayed
as antisocial outliers and not John Does taken from a list of ordinary names,
then the message is not that our fellow citizens will defect whenever it is
convenient; the message is that these particular expatriates are not a part of
the society we recognize.
One of the most notorious tax cheats in history was the "Queen of
Mean," Leona Helmsley. 10 4 Helmsley, who famously insisted that "[o]nly
the little people pay taxes,"105 won a highly-publicized four-year prison
term for her violation of reciprocity, but the message of her public
humiliation wasn't that tax evasion was rampant; it was that Helmsley was
a social deviant. Even fifteen years later, her name is synonymous with
treachery, and her infamy still fascinates the public.
106
A similar alleged tax cheat probably worthy of shame and publicity is
telecommunications tycoon Walter Anderson, who was recently jailed on
charges that he failed to report $450 million in income and failed to pay
$200 million in taxes. 10 7 It is plausible that the publicity that will follow
from his trial will again support the notion that most everybody lives to
civic obligations but that Anderson has chosen a different-and horribly
unacceptable-route.
The contrast between Helmsley and Anderson with George Johnson of
Crystal, Minnesota, is stark. Johnson's name appears on Minnesota's
DelinqNet taxpayer list because he owes the state $8,944.36 in taxes from
2001 and 2002.108 I do not personally know Johnson, or anybody in
Crystal, Minnesota, for that matter. He could be practically anybody. And
from what little we know about him, it is difficult to think of him as at all
similar to Helmsley or Anderson. The Minnesota list sends the impression
104 Helmsley was jailed for mail fraud and tax evasion. See RANSDELL PIERSON, THE
QUEEN OF MEAN (1989); William Glaberson, Helmsley Gets 4-Year Term for Tax Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1989, at B1.
105 Don Kaplan, Donald Dodges a 'Leona '-ism, N.Y. POST, Nov. 4, 2003, at 96.
106 As of October 9, 2005, searching LEXIS's five-year news database for "Leona
Helmsley" yields 1805 hits. This is remarkable because Helmsley was released from prison
over a decade ago and hasn't done anything particularly newsworthy since.
107 Carol D. Leonnig, Tax Fraud Suspect Wants Bail Set; Telecom Tycoon Could Flee
Before Trial, Prosecutors Argue, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2005, at A6.
108 In the interests of personal privacy, George Johnson is a composite of several names
on the list. There are many Georges and Johnsons, somebody who owes $8,944.36, and five
people from Crystal, Minnesota. But you will have to go to the list yourself to figure out
their real stories. See Minn. Rev., DelinqNet: Individual List, http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/
collection/delinqnet/delinqnet overview.shtml (follow the "Individual List" hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 15, 2005).
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that ordinary people-like you, me, and George-evade taxes on occasion,
and this is where shaming is counterproductive.
Where cooperative norms keep us within the bounds of the law,
untargeted shaming sanctions must be avoided. They create a perception-
right or wrong-that communal norms are not universal, which leads to
increased cynicism and decreased compliance. Instead, public statements
should emphasize our broad consensus while more private mechanisms are
used to encourage law-breakers to return to social norm compliance.
IV. HoMO MORALIS
Third-party social constraints make crime more costly and our
relationships with others create incentives to reciprocate. But frequently,
our internal compasses guide our actions, and first-party morality constrains
behavior. Our Homo moralis instincts tell us that some crimes are
unthinkable. We do not care how stiff or how weak the penalty is for child
molestation, we do not do it because we are not child molesters. It does not
matter if there has been a surge of murders in our hometown; we are not
going to kill anybody because we are not murderers.
The logic of Homo moralis is quite circular. Crimes that take on a
moral character typically carry the heftiest penalties; and yet they carry the
heftiest penalties because they are the most serious. It is difficult to unravel
the mechanics of how activities gain and lose an association with
morality-but morality does evolve over time. Prosecution for sex crimes
against women has not always been particularly aggressive and the duel
was once considered a proper way to adjudicate disputes. But today, both
are unthinkable crimes that many would characterize as running contrary to
their self-definitions. History notwithstanding, one generalization that
seems plausible is that moral norms develop and fall over the course of
generations, not years, and once crimes attain the weight of moral authority
for an individual person, he is unlikely to waver in this characterization.
What is clear is that morality matters. Scholars have alternately
characterized conscience and personal morality as providing another source
of deterrence (through self-punishment) 0 9 or as "the attitudinal factor[]...
[best able] to predict variance in [criminal law] compliance." ' 1° But how
does the criminal law affect our morality?
109 Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and
Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 837, 839-40
(1990) (analogizing conscience-driven punishments to state-imposed sanctions).
110 ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 60 (1990); see also Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453,468-71 (1997).
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A glance at the law and norms movement suggests a strong
relationship between the criminal law, the signals the law sends, and the
strength of our Homo moralis aversion to crime. The law is subsidized by a
moral legitimacy when citizens perceive the law as a plausible statement of
what the community as a whole would implement. This moral legitimacy,
in turn, encourages us to obey the law at the margins even when it does not
directly accord our internalized morality. To the extent that the government
overreaches and overly penalizes behavior that most people view as non-
harmful, this crime-preventing force wanes. And if the government
chooses to introduce widespread shaming, the possibility of crowding out
arises. For if the public is called upon regularly to shame criminals at the
government's behest, this may lessen the third-party shaming that we rely
upon to informally enforce norms.
A. THE MORAL SUBSIDY OF THE LAW
We have seen already that social pressures and the fear of punishment
can promote legal compliance, but commentators have also observed that
the law itself has authority that promotes legal compliance independent of
attached penalties. People "generally see themselves as moral beings who
want to do the right thing as they perceive it," and a well-crafted statute
book shapes people's perception of what is "the right thing." '111 To be
precise, Robinson and Darley argue that "[c]riminal law's influence comes
from being a societal mechanism by which the force of social norms is
realized and by which the force of internal moral principles is
strengthened."
1 12
Of course, this does not imply that the government can pass any law
and need only wait for public morality to absorb its commands. Tom Tyler
writes of the importance of legitimacy in criminal law, which "underlies
[the] expectation that the public will generally obey the law" and supplies
empirical data to support his assertion. 13 Tyler puts special weight on
procedural aspects of judicial administration, which promote fairness, 114 but
notes further that there is a strong correlation between the extent to which a
person finds the law morally credible and her compliance. 1
5
So this suggests that the government can always pass laws that
everybody agrees with and can almost never successfully promote reform
1 Robinson & Darley, supra note 110, at 468.
112 Id. at 471.
113 TYLER, supra note 110, at 161.
114 Id. at 162-65.
115 See id. at 64-68; Robinson & Darley, supra note 110, at 474-75.
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where social norms stand strongly opposed. This is the "sticky norms
problem"' 16:
If the law condemns too severely-if it tries to break the grip of the contested norm
(and the will of its supporters) with a "hard shove"--it will likely prove a dead letter
and could even backfire. If it condemns more mildly-if it "gently nudges" citizens
toward the desired behavior and attitudes-it might well initiate a process that
culminates in the near eradication of the contested norm and the associated types of
behavior. 117
Characterizing the problem in economic terms, Kahan argues that the
strength of the government's response (i.e., where on the "gentle nudge"-
"hard shove" spectrum is optimal) is a function of the portions of the
population willing to enforce and to oppose a given legal change. 1
8
As a general matter, people are willing to enforce laws against
"criminals," but they are hesitant to penalize ordinary people who happen to
do something wrong. This distinction plays into the "sticky norms"
problem and the legitimacy of the law. When the state publicly punishes a
notorious individual criminal, like Leona Helmsley,' 19 it has a legitimating
effect: the rules of the law apply to everybody and they serve us well. But
when the law is applied broadly-even though its application may still be
uniform and consistent-the message is different. Suddenly, people like
you and me are getting caught up in government excess, and the overall
legitimacy of the law suffers. The feedback of using shoves where nudges
are appropriate only strengthens the social norms the government may seek
to prevent.' 
20
On the flip side, in concert with the strong expressive content of
shame, Homo moralis is reinforced where shame is applied to areas of
strong social agreement. But, where society agrees strongest on moral
conduct, long prison terms are the norm and shaming rarely enters the
picture. Shaming is typically reserved for minor offenses like petty theft,
commercial crimes, and nonviolent sex crimes like solicitation.12 1 In these
situations, shame will be most effective when targeted to specific crimes
worthy of emphasis.
116 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky
Norms Problem, 67 U. C-iI. L. REv. 607 (2000).
117 Id. at 609.
"'s See id. at 613-18.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
120 See Kahan, supra note 116, at 616.
121 Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in
Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2186, 2188 (2003).
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B. THE CROWDING OUT OF MORAL VIRTUE
One of the primary draws of the shaming sanction is the power of
shame in society. It is hard to underestimate the power of social
disapprobation. Humans are social creatures; we rely upon our networks of
friends, acquaintances, and fellow citizens to progress through life.
Anything that damages this network can be traumatic and costly, so it is no
surprise that techniques of excommunication have enforced social norms
for centuries.
But a key question in the law-and-norms movement is how society
reacts when the government formalizes a previously-informal social
mechanism. In the shaming context, does the government acquire a
functional monopoly on shame when it assumes regular responsibility for
parading around miscreants? That is, even if shaming requires public
participation, as this reflex becomes Pavlovian, will we lose our capacity to
independently determine when non-penalized actions violate our social
norms? Will we continue to use informal shame in the same manner and
frequency when suddenly the government is responsible for conducting our
orchestra of disgrace? These are sociological and empirical questions
without easy answers, but they counsel caution in the expansion of shame.
Even if the government became the sole assigner of public shame,
some scholars would still applaud. While some courts have been skeptical
as to the rehabilitative capabilities of shaming penalties that rely upon
public derision,122  Stephen Garvey argues, however, that alternative
sanctions serve to educate morally through a return to the theory of lex
talionis-the law of "an eye for an eye."'' 23 He writes that "[t]alionic
punishments force an offender to somehow experience the harm he has
caused,"' 124 and that applying the ideals of moral reform theory to our penal
system could effectively reduce recidivism in a forward-looking, utilitarian
fashion. 125 He does not actually encourage us to penalize criminals with
their eyes or any attacks on their physical health, but he points to examples
such as Tennessee judge Joe Brown, who has taken to "allowing burglary
victims to visit the burglar's home and take something of equal value while
the burglar watches" as a means to educate a criminal whose Homo moralis
instincts are lacking.126 This punishment may or may not succeed in getting
122 See Garvey, supra note 4, at 755.
123 Id. at 762-83, 784.
124 Id. at 784.
125 See id. at 766.
126 Joe B. Brown, Judge Devises Instructional Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1993, at
B16; see Garvey, supra note 4, at 784.
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the criminal to understand what it is really like to be robbed, but at least the
sanction has a constructive slant.
For our purposes, introducing shame for Homo moralis crimes could
potentially "morally educate" the specific offenders without threatening the
social norms underlying the proscribed conduct, but only under two
conditions: (1) The underlying social norm must be close enough to the
state-prescribed requirement to fall within the government's legitimate
moral subsidy; and (2) the penalty must be focused enough to highlight the
individual failings of the people who are shamed. So again, we note that
broad, standard shaming penalties are least likely to be effective and most
likely to trigger perverse feedback reactions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Thus far, shaming penalties have been applied by legislatures wishing
to specifically deter criminal activity or by judges, frustrated by the current
array of penalties, who want to craft a special punishment for a special
offender. But as shaming penalties become more prevalent and less novel,
more attention must be paid to the expressive effects of shaming on society-
at-large. Using our framework for the primary reasons people avoid
criminal activity, an increase in shaming could damage reciprocal norms,
could wound the state's moral legitimacy, and could marginally decrease
the deterrence experienced by a cost-minimizing, rational decision-maker.
These side-effects are not the inevitable fallout of shaming, but the harm
caused by shaming misapplied by those who ignore its expressive value on
the audience that soaks in the publicity.
The framework set out above suggests that there are three primary
reasons why we do not commit crimes: economics, reciprocity, and
morality. These elements are interrelated on many levels. By dramatically
increasing the sanctions for marijuana possession, a state appeals to the
Homo economicus instincts of its citizens, but Homo moralis may no longer
see the law as a codification of society's will. But weakening the penalties
too much to coincide with social consensus could thwart the Homo
economicus deterrence of drug use. Increasing the penalties for jury duty
evasion may be perfectly consistent with our views of the law and may be
economically efficient, but if the tone of the message suggests that jury
compliance is low, then Homo reciprocans will feedback. The feedback
possibilities are all heightened with shame because its public nature relies
upon community involvement and uses psychological quirks to exaggerate
the enforcement-and therefore the perceived prevalence-of crime.
There are no silver bullets when it comes to criminal justice, but there
are better and poorer ways to enforce the law. In order to invoke alternative
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sanctions properly, decision-makers must be aware of the social
consequences. Although there should be little concern in invoking shame
when violent or otherwise notorious crimes are committed by identifiable
social outcasts, certain crimes against society are not ideal candidates for
public humiliation--despite society's interest in retribution. And even
when the goal is just to increase the costs of criminal activity, we must be
aware that there are counteracting forces that may undo the benefits we seek
to achieve.
Shaming has been the subject of much scholarly debate in recent years,
but the field is still remarkably lacking in solid empirical findings. Perhaps
this is a sign that shaming will never grow to prominence and that the
concerns raised in this Article will never materialize; but before we
systematize alternative sanctions, we should be sure to fully recognize the
perverse messages that we send about social norms when we publicly
shame our criminals.
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